

Message Text

PAGE 01 PARIS 24933 01 OF 02 212043Z

72

ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 IO-03 EA-13 SPC-03 EB-03 CU-03

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 NSC-10 NSCE-00 PA-01

PRS-01 USIE-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 DRC-01 PM-03

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 24933

LIMDIS

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E...: 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, FR.

SUBJ: QUAI VIEW OF POMPIDOU VISIT TO CHINA

SUMMARY: QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ASIA, DUZER, SAID
THAT GIVEN WHAT THE FRENCH EXPECTED FROM THE POMPIDOU
VISIT, THEY WERE VERY SATISFIED. THE CHINESE WELCOME
WAS VERY WARM AND SHOWED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
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PAGE 02 PARIS 24933 01 OF 02 212043Z

RELATIONSHIP FOR CHOU'S POLICIES. THERE WERE FEW
SURPRISES IN THE DISCUSSION OF WORLD PROBLEMS; PRC
VIEWS WERE PRIMARILY INFLUENCED BY THE SOVIET THREAT.
NO NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN

OR KOREAN UNGA PROBLEMS WERE SUGGESTED. PROSPECTS WERE CONSIDERED GOOD FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE. END SUMMARY.

1. QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ASIA, ROGER DUZER, GAVE EMBOFF A FAIRLY LENGTHY BRIEFING CONCERNING PRESIDENT POMPIDOU'S SEPTEMBER 11-17 VISIT TO THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA. (PRC). HE DIVIDED HIS EXPOSE INTO THREE MAIN PARTS: A. A GENERAL ATMOSPHERE; B. TOUR D'HORIZON OF WORLD PROBLEMS; C. FRANCO/CHINESE BILATERAL RELATIONS.

2. A. A GENERAL ATMOSPHERE: DIZER SAID THE WARMTH OF THE CHINESE RECEPTION SURPASSED THEIR EXPECTATIONS. CHINESE ATTENTION SEEMED DESIGNED TO HIGHLIGHT FOR INTERNAL CHINESE CONSUMPTION AS WELL AS FOREIGNERS (PROBABLY THE SOVIETS AS WELL AS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES) THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE PRC ATTACHED TO THE VISIT. THERE WERE SUCH SYMBOLIC COURTESIES AS THE CALL ON CHAIRMAN MAO IN THE FIRST DAY OF THE VISIT, THREE LONG AND INTENSIVE WORKING CONVERSATIONS WITH COU, CHOU'S ACCOMPANYING POMPIDOU THROUGHOUT THE VISIT TO THE PROVINCES, CHOU'S ATTENDING A SMALL DINNER AT POMPIDOU'S RESIDENCE, AND THE CRESCENDO OF THE MASS DEMONSTRATIONS CULMINATING IN THE NEARLY 100,000 CHINESE ASSEMBLED FOR THE PROCESSION DOWN AVENUE JOFFRE IN SHANGHAI. IT WAS CLEAR THAT CHINESE INTENTIONS WERE NOT MERELY TO PLEASE THEIR GUESTS, BUT TO ACCOMPLISH POLITICAL PURPOSES IN SHOWING SUCH WARMTH FOR THE FIRST WESTERN EUROPEAN HEAD OF STATE TO MAKE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO CHINA. DUZER COMMENTED THAT VISIT CLEARLY RATIFIED CHOU'S POLICY OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES.

3. B. TOUR D'HORIZON OF WORLD PROBLEMS.
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PAGE 03 PARIS 24933 01 OF 02 212043Z

GENERAL INTERNATIONAL POLICY. THE CHINESE SHOWED THAT THEIR WORLD VIEW WAS POLARIZED AROUND THE ROLE OF THE USSR. IT WAS CLEAR TO THE FRENCH THAT THE CHINESE NOW SAW NO POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND TOOK CONSIDERABLE PAINS TO SHOW THAT THE PRC WAS "READY FOR THE WORST." IN CONSEQUENCE, THE PRC OVERALL WORLD VIEW WAS PESSIMISTIC. ALTHOUGH CHOU DID NOT HOLD THAT WAR WAS INEVITABLE, HE EXPRESSED LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THE SUCCESS OF THE "OPTIMISTIC" FRENCH POLICY OF A "VIGILANT DETENTE". CHOU DID NOT SAY THE PRC WAS HOSTILE TO DETENTE AND PEACE, BUT MERELY THAT HE HAD NO CONFIDENCE THAT THIS

POLICY WOULD WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION. PRC DID NOT CONTEST FRANCE'S RIGHT TO SUCH AN APPROACH; WITH CHINESE DELICACY, CHOU DID NOT EVEN SAY THE GOF WAS WRONG, BUT MERELY SAID THE PRC BELIEVED CHINA MUST BE ON GUARD AGAINST THE USSR.

4. EUROPE AND THE USSR. DUZER THOUGHT THAT THE DOULE FORMULATION IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE CHINESE AND FRENCH VIEWS ON EUROPE WAS UNFORTUNATE IN THAT IT HIGH-LIGHTED A MINOR DIFFERENCE WHILE CONCEALING THE LARGER AREAS OF AGREEMENT. BOTH SIDES WERE INTERESTED IN EUROPEAN UNITY AND SECURITY. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE WAS THAT THE PRC COULD NOT APPEAR TO ENDORSE AN ATTEMPT, HOWEVER VIGILANT, AT A DETENTE WITH THE USSR. IN THE TALKS, THE PRC APPEARED TO BE SATISFIED THAT THE GOF WOULD PURSUE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE USSR IN SUCH A FASHION AS TO AVOID WEAKENING EUROPEAN DEFENSE, THEREBY MEETING THE PRC'S REAL EUROPEAN CONCERNS.

5. SOVIET MENACE. DUZER SAID THAT THE PRC OFFICIALS GAVE NO PRECISE INDICATIONS OF THE NATURE OR TIME FRAME OF THE SOVIET MENACE. THERE APPEARED TO BE A CURVE IN THE PRC LINE. IN 1970-71 PRC OFFICIALS CAME DOWN HARD ON THE GREAT AND APPROXIMATE SOVIET THREAT. IN 1972 PRC OFFICIALS SUCH AS CHO'IAO KUAN-HUA SPOKE MORE IN TERMS OF THE USSR DEVELOPING INTO A DANGER IN THE FUTURE. CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 PARIS 24933 01 OF 02 212043Z

IN 1973 THE LINE HAD RETURNED CLOSER TO THAT OF 1970-71. THE ATTACK COULD COME PERHAPS NOW, PERHAPS LATER. THE SOVIET THREAT WAS GIVEN AS DIRECTED EQUALLY AT EUROPE AND ASIA, CHOU APPEARED TO BE SAYING WE ARE READY FOR IT, AND YOU SHOULD BE ALSO. CHOU SPOKE OF THE NECESSITY OF MOBILIZING THE MASSES IN THE FACE OF THIS SOVIET CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. DUZER FELT CHOU MIGHT EVEN BE SUGGESTING THAT ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF THE PRC EMPHASIS ON THE SOVIET DANGER WAS THE DESIRE TO MOBILIZE THE MASSES. DUZER CONFESSED THAT THEY HAD NOT HOWEVER, BEEN ABLE TO COME UP WITH A SATISFACTORY PICTURE OF WHAT THE PRC LEADERSHIP REALLY THINKS AND WHY.

6. U.S. CHOU SELDOM MENTIONED THE U.S. WHEN SPEAKING OF THE TWO HEGEMONIES HE CITED PROBLEMS ONLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION; FOR EXAMPLE HE MADE NO MENTION OF THE USSR/US RIVALRY, WHICH FIGURED IN HIS REPORT TO THE 10TH CCP CONGRESS. HE CLEARLY DID NOT ATTRIBUTE TO THE U.S. THE MALEVOLENT INTENTIONS HE ASCRIBED TO THE SOVIET

LEADERS. CHOU SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE AS ESSENTIAL TO EUROPEAN SECURITY. CHOU ALSO SAID THERE WERE AREAS IN ASIA WHERE PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES COULD CREATE A DANGEROUS VACUUM WHICH COULD BE FILLED BY ANOTHER POWER, I.E. USSR. CHOU IMPLIED THERE WERE OTHER AREAS, SUCH AS INDOCHINA, WHERE A VACUUM WOULD BE FILLED BY "THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES," A SOLUTION WHICH PRESENTED NO DANGERS.

7. INDO CHINA. THE FRENCH WERE SURPRISED THAT THE CHINESE HAD PRACTICALLY NOTHING TO SAY ABOUT VIETNAM AND LAOS BEYOND EXPRESSING SATISFACTION OVER THE SIGNATURE OF THE RESPECTIVE AGREEMENTS. ON THE OTHER HAND THE CHINESE SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT THEIR COMMITMENT TO SIHANOUK AND HIS GOVERNMENT. ALSO, IT WAS CLEAR THAT WHEN THE PRC REFERRED TO FOREIGN CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 PARIS 24933 01 OF 02 212043Z

"INTERVENTION" IT PROBABLY HAD THE U.S. IN MIND; WHILE FRANCE INTERPRETED THIS AS REFERRING ALSO TO THE DRV. IT SEEMED CLEAR THE CHINESE WISHED TO DEFINE PUBLICLY THEIR POSITION WHICH DIFFERS FROM THAT OF FRANCE. GOF, WHILE NOT OPPOSED NECESSARILY TO SIHANOUK, DOES NOT CONSIDER HIM THE HEAD OF STATE AND HEAD OF THE ONLY "LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT." CHOU SAID THAT THE CHINESE DID NOT ALWAYS AGREE WITH SIHANOUK -- JUST AS THEY DID NOT ALWAYS AGREE WITH BHUTTO -- BUT, THEY DID NOT ACCORDINGLY DIMINISH THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE TWO LEADERS. CHOU EVEN IMPLIED SUCH SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK, IN THE FACE OF DISAGREEMENTS, SHOWED THAT THE PRC DID NOT INTERFERE IN CAMBODIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. DUZER ADMITTED THAT THE CAMBODIAN DISCUSSION HAD BEEN ON A LEVEL OF HIGH GENERALITY AND IT WAS

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PAGE 01 PARIS 24933 02 OF 02 212039Z

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 24933

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IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE FROM WHAT TH CHINESE
SAID JUST WHAT THEIR SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK MEANT
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE
COMMUNIST SIDE IN CAMBODIA. NO MENTION WAS MADE
OF ANY OTHER KHMER LEADER AND THE CHINESE DID
NOT HINT AT THE DRV ROLE IN CAMBODIA. IT WAS
THEREFORE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE
PRC FORMULA COULD MEAN SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK
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PAGE 02 PARIS 24933 02 OF 02 212039Z

IN OPPOSITON TO A KHMER COMMUNIST/DRV
COMBINATION.

8. JAPAN. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO MENTION OF
JAPAN IN THE COMMUNIQUE, JAPAN WAS INDEED DISCUSSED.
CHOU SKETCHED HIS HOPES AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN AND MADE NO VIRULENT
ATTACK ON ITS CURRENT LEADERSHIP AS HE HAD
PREVIOUSLY DONE IN THE CASE OF SATO. CHOU SAID
THE FUTURE OF JAPAN WAS UNCERTAIN; IT COULD
DEVELOP FAVORABLY, BUT ALSO COULD DEVELOP IN A
DANGEROUS DIRECTION TOWARD MILITARY RULE. CHOU
DID NOT CRITICIZE THE CURRENT MILITARY ESTABLISH-
MENT, AND IN FACT SPOKE OF JAPAN AS NEEDING MILITARY
FORCES FOR SELF-DEFENSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, CHOU
SAID THAT JAPAN WAS AN "ABNORMAL" ECONOMIC POWER:

IN THAT SUCH A LARGE PART OF ITS ECONOMY WAS IMPORT/EXPORT. FOREIGN EVENTS COULD THEREFORE INFLUENCE JAPANESE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS UNFAVORABLY. OVERALL CHOU APPEARED TO BE SOMEWHAT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT JAPAN'S CHANCES FOR FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT.

9. KOREA. DUZER SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIQUE MENTIONED KOREA, THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF KOREA AT THE CHOU/POMPIDOU LEVEL. THE COMMUNIQUE MEANS ONLY WHAT IT SAYS, WITH THE SLIGHTLY DIFFERING INTERPRETATION WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS COULD PUT ON THE WORDING FAVORING THE JULY 1972 JOINT STATEMENT. DUZER KNEW OF NO DISCUSSION WHICH WOULD CAST ANY LIGHT ON DPRK AND PRC POSITIONS ON THE KOREAN ISSUE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT HIS PERSONAL VIEW IS THAT THE PRC COULD NEVER AGREE TO ANY RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD ENDORSE UN MEMBERSHIP FOR THE TWO KOREAS. WHETHER THE PRC WAS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING TAIWAN OR WHETHER IT MERELY WISHED TO SUPPORT THE DPRK, DUZER COULD NOT GUESS. HE THOUGHT THAT ON THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE KOREA PROBLEM VIS-A-VIS THE UN (UNCURK AND UNC), SOMETHING MIGHT BE WORKED OUT WITH THE PRC. CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PARIS 24933 02 OF 02 212039Z

10. TAIWAN. TAIWAN DID NOT EMERGE AS A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN THE CONVERSATIONS; CHOU MENTIONED TAIWAN ONCE AS ONE OF THE IMPORTANT WORLD PROBLEMS WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN SOLVED.

11. C. FRANCO/CHINESE BILATERAL RELATIONS. ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE FRENCH WERE VERY SATISFIED WITH CHOU'S CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF CHINESE INTEREST IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIC EXCHANGES. CHOU DID NOT MERELY EXPRESS A PRO FORMA WISH, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PRC NEEDS AN INCREASE IN THE EXCHANGES SINCE THEY ARE TIED IN WITH HIS INTERNAL POLICY. THE FRENCH ARE CONVINCED TRADE RELATIONS WILL IMPROVE, PARTICULARLY THROUGH THE EXPORT OF COMPLETE PLANTS, AS THE REFERENCE TO THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL EXCHANGES IMPLIED. DUZER SAID THAT THE LIST OF INDUSTRIAL FIELDS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TOO SERIOUSLY AS REPRESENTING WHAT WAS DISCUSSED OR WHAT IS EXPECTED IN THE FUTURE, BUT MERELY AS A GOOD REPRESENTATION OF EXCHANGES TO DATE. DUZER SAID THAT THE CONCORDE SALES HAD NOT BEEN CONFIRMED, BUT THERE WAS POSSIBILITIES OF SALES OF OTHER TYPES OF PLANES. AS FOR THE PESSIMISTIC TONE INITIALLY TAKEN BY POMPIDOU, DUZER SAID THAT

IT WAS DESIGNED TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE DIP IN TRADE IN 1972 AND TO PROD BOTH THE CHINESE AND FRENCH BUSINESSMEN TO DO BETTER. THE OPTIMISTIC TONE IN THE COMMUNIQUE, HOWEVER, BETTER REPRESENTS THE VIEW BOTH SIDES HAVE OF THE FUTURE.

12. CULTURAL EXCHANGES. THE FRENCH BELIEVED CHOU VERY MUCH FAVORED FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THEIR CULTURAL EXCHANGES AS BEING BENEFICIAL TO CHINA. HOWEVER IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN CHINA STILL CONTAINS ENOUGH DISPUTES CONCERNING CULTURAL MATTERS TO LIMIT THE RATE OF GROWTH AND TYE TYPE OF CULTURAL CONTACTS WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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PAGE 04 PARIS 24933 02 OF 02 212039Z

13. PERSONAL CONTACTS. DUZER SAID THAT THE REFERENCE TO PERSONAL CONTACTS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS INDICATING A POSSIBLE VISIT BY CHOU TO FRANCE. IT MEANT EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES AND POSSIBLY OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES.

14. INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION. DUZER SAID THAT CHINESE INTERNAL POLITICS WERE OBVIOUSLY NOT DISCUSSED, AND NOTHING EMERGED FROM THE VISIT WHICH WOULD CAST ANY LIGHT ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION. HOEVER, SPEAKING AS A PEKINGOLOGIST, HE THOUGHT CHOU SHOWED EVEN MORE AUTHORITY THIS YEAR THAN HE DID LAST YEAR WHEN DUZER ACCOMPANIED THE THEN FOREIGN MINISTER SCHUMANN. CHOU WAS THIS YEAR RELAXED TO THE POINT OF USING MORE FRENCH THAN HE EVER HAD BEFORE. WANG HUNG-WEN HAD RECEIVED THEM IN SHANGHAI, AS ONE WOULD EXPECT. HIS PRESENCE APPEARED TO BE PRO FORMA, AND HE DID NOT ENTER INTO ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS -- DUZER WONDERED WHETHER HE COULD. ALTHOUGH HE NOW HELD A NATIONAL POSITION, IT WAS HARD TO CONCLUDE FROM HIS ACTIONS WHETHER HE WAS INDEED A NATIONAL LEADER. ON THE OTHER HAND, TENG HSIAN-PING WAS VERY MUCH IN EVIDENCE, EVEN ESCORTING POMPIDOU TO THE FORBIDDEN CITY, AND CONVERSING FREELY WITH HIM -- DUZER DID NOT HAVE A REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF TENG'S FRENCH. CHIANG CH'ING'S APPEARANCE AT THE BALLET WAS EXPECTED, BUT ACCORDING TO DUZER HER ATTEMPT AT WESTERN GARB SUGGESTED THE SALVATION ARMY MORE THAN FRANCO/CHINESE CULTURE EXCHANGE.

15. WE SHALL SEND IN FURTHER REPORTS OF THE POMPIDOU VISIT AS WE HEAR FROM OTHERS.

GDS.
IRWIN

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 10 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 SEP 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: morefirh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973PARIS24933
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: PARIS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730963/abqceggkc.tel
Line Count: 384
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: morefirh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <23-Jul-2001 by reddocgw>; APPROVED <18-Sep-2001 by morefirh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: QUAI VIEW OF POMPIDOU VISIT TO CHINA
TAGS: PFOR, CH, FR
To: STATE
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Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005